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Abstract  
 
In Italy, poverty and disability are two strictly related issues (Parodi, 2004, 2006, 2007; Parodi and 
Sciulli, 2008; Davila Quintana and Malo, 2012). Moreover, public transfers are not sufficient to 
exlude households with at least one disabled member from the poverty risk. We simulate a simple 
Real Business Cycle model to investigate the macroeconomic effects of a permanent increase in 
civilian disability pensions. In particular, we stress whether such a policy action is effective to 
stimulate private consumption. The exercise is implemented through both temporary and permanent 
reduction of public spending. Results show that in the long run a minimum increase in civilian 
disability pensions allows households with one disabled member to consume more and, 
importantly, to exit from poverty condition. In the short run we observe a policy trade-off. If public 
spending reduction is temporary and fast, private consumptions immediately increase but output 
deeply falls. On the contrary, if public spending permanently and slowly reduces, the recessionary 
effect softens but private consumptions only gradually increase. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Among the European countries, in Italy the poverty risk is one of the 
As a matter of fact, the 19,4% of individuals holds a disposable income
poverty threshold, against the 17%
households with one or more disabled me
2004, 2006, 2007; Parodi and Sciulli, 2008; Davila Quintana and Malo, 2012).
Figure 1 shows the strong relationship between the disability rate and 
Italy (the correlation coefficient is
disability rate grows up the incidence of poverty increases. 
feature poverty and disability rates higher with to respect to the 
between the vertical and horizontal
 
Figure 1 -  Relationship between poverty incidence
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The literature on disability argues
income. In fact, the spouse leaves
Moreover, public transfers are not sufficient to
the disabled member. Furthermore
disabled people (Parodi and Sciulli, 2008)
not sufficient effects. 
The main tools adopted to reduce the poverty risk for househol
disability pensions and social expenditure
Pensions are determined at national
municipal level. That’s why it’s very 
Figure 2 shows the key role of transfers in reducing the poverty risk of disabled
public transfers the risk is reduced by more than 100%, reaching 140% in 2009 (see the rate of 
growth in Figure 2). 
Although the positive effect of transfers, the poverty risk is still high (it’s about 30%). Therefore
massive interventions are necessary, especially in South of Italy (see 
 
Figure 2 – Percentage of disabled members before and after public transfers
 
Source: our data processing EUROSTAT
 
Therefore, under the assumption 
 How much do civilian disability pensions (CDP, henceforth) need to increase in order to 
flush out households with disabled member 
 Which are the effects on the key 
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To answer to the questions above we simulate a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model, 
DSGE. These models imply that each equation has an economic interpretation which allows a clear 
identification of policy actions and their transmission mechanisms (Peiris and Saxegaard, 2007). 
As far as we know, this is the first contribution in the literature analysing, in a general equilibrium 
framework, the macroeconomic effects of a fiscal policy devoted to unburden the economic 
conditions of households with a disabled member. 
Results show that an increase of 0.1% of CDP importantly guarantees the exit from poverty status 
for households with a disabled member and entails an increase of their consumption. Moreover, in 
the short run we observe a policy trade-off. If public spending reduction is temporary and fast, 
private consumptions immediately increase but output deeply falls. On the contrary, if public 
spending permanently and slowly reduces, the recessionary effect softens but private consumptions 
only gradually increase. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reports a processing data exercise about the 
poverty risk of households with disabled member. Section 3 describes the model, the fiscal policy 
exercise implementation and parameters’ calibration. Section 4 shows the results and, finally, 
section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The poverty risk of households with a disabled member. An exercise using Italian data.  
In this section we compute the fraction of income that household have to spend for the disabled 
people’s care. We also compute the target value of CDP which is necessary to cover these costs and 
to exclude the poverty risk for households with a disabled member. 
We will make very simple assumptions helping us to overcome problem of the lack of data. 
 
2.1 Share of income needed to cover disability costs 
2.1.1 Computational issues on income of households with and without disabled member 
A precise measure of fraction of income devolved to cover disability cost is not actually available. 
Therefore, we proceed to its computation making the following hypothesis on households. 
In our model we consider two groups of households: 
 ND household composed by three adult and non disabled persons. Two out of three persons 
work and thus have a labour income. Both have a full-time job (8 hours per day and six days 
per week or, equally, 220 days per year). We assume that the two workers are a male and a 
female. The third individual could be an adult son/daughter that never worked. The last 
assumption makes easier the analysis because it excludes the unemployment benefits from 
household’s income computation. 
 D household composed by three individuals, including one disabled member. Only the male 
works full time, while the female doesn’t work devoting her time to disabled people’s cares. 
The household’s income will be the male’s labour income plus public transfer in favour of 
the disabled people. 
We assume that the disabled member is affected by a severe disability. If this is the case the nation-
state provides the CDP and also the attendance allowance. Moreover we have also to consider the 
expenditure for social services in favour of disabled members. 
We take into account different data sources. In particular, the labour income by gender is from 
INPS
4
 data, the CDP plus the attendance allowance and expenditure for social services are from 
ISTAT (2014)
5
. 
Table 1 reports the income computation of D and ND household. The income inequality between 
the two types is clear. In particular, we observe that D household’s income is the 85% of the ND 
household’s income. Public transfers in favour of D households are not sufficient to make incomes 
equal. This result is in line with the empirical literature arguing that D households are mainly 
exposed to the poverty risk (Davila Quintana and Malo, 2012; Parodi, 2007; Parodi and Sciulli, 
2008; Parodi and Sciulli, 2012a; Parodi and Sciulli, 2012b). 
The major poverty risk for D households is evident computing the equivalized income and its 
comparison with the poverty line. Following Davila Quintana and  Malo (2012), we compute the 
modified OECD scale. Such a scale assigns a different weight to each household’s member. In 
particular, it appoints weight 1 to the first adult, 0.5 to other adult individuals and 0.3 to children 
below 14 years. The modified OCED scale reads as follows:  = 1 + 0.5 ∗ 	
 − 1 + 0.3 ∗ 
, 
where 
 is the adults’ number and 
 is the childrens’ number. From the equivalized income 
computation, allowing a comparison between the two households’ incomes, we observe that both 
incomes are above the poverty line. However, D household’s income is much lower than the ND 
household’s income. In particular, we observe that D household’s income is 1.53 times the poverty 
line, while ND household’s income is 1.80 times the poverty line. This way to build the poverty line 
has been strongly criticized because it doesn’t take into account disability (Davila Quintana and 
Malo, 2012; Kuklys, 2005). Kuklys (2005) considers an equivalence scale assigning a weight of 
1.56 to disabled members; the same has been done by Davila Quintana and Malo (2012) for 
European data processing. Therefore now the modified OCED scale reads as follows: 1 + 0.5 ∗	
 − 1 + 0.5 ∗ 	
 − 
 + 0.3 ∗ 
, where 
 is the adults’ number, 
  is the disabled 
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 http://www.inps.it/webidentity/banchedatistatistiche/menu/dipendenti/main.html (last access april 29, 2015). 
The household income is equal to the sum of the labor income out of personal taxes and social contributions from 
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 http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCIS_SPESESERSOC&Lang=  (last access april 29, 2015). 
members’ number e 
 is the children’s number. As for ND households the modified OECD scale 
is exactly the one previously considered. With respect to the previous formula, we observe that the 
equivalence coefficient increases for a D household. Moreover, also the equivalized income of 
disabled members reduces by 4000 euro. This result highlights how much it’s important to consider 
disability to study the poverty issue and that the poverty risk is underrated when disability is 
excluded from the poverty line computation. This calls for much massive interventions of the policy 
maker. 
Table 1- Income per household type, year 2013(*) 
AVERAGE ANNUAL VALUES YEAR 2013 
APPROXIMATION HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
D 
HOUSEHOLD 
ND 
HOUSEHOLD 
Average annual salary (male) (+) 24376,15322€ 24376,15322€ 
Average annual salary (female) (+) . 16728,36482€ 
Civilian disability pension with attendance allowance (+) 7756,72€ . 
Expenditure for social interventions and services (+) 2886€ . 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 35018,87322€ 41104,51803€ 
Computation of the equivalized income   
modified OECD scale:	 = 1 + 0.5 ∗ 	
 − 1 + 0.3 ∗ 
  2 2 
equivalized income without revision for disability 17509,43661€ 20552,25902€ 
Poverty line (60% of median equivalent income) 11418,50869€ 
equivalence scale including disability:	 = 1.56 ∗ 1 + 0.5 ∗ 	
 − 1 + 0.5 ∗ 	
 −
 + 0.3 ∗
 2,56 2 
equivalized income with revision for disability 13679,24735€ 20552,25902€ 
Poverty line (60% of median equivalent income) 10269,45191€ 
Source: our data processing on  INPS and  ISTAT. 
 
2.1.2 Social costs computation 
In the costs of diseases analysis, evaluations of costs associated to illness are defined as social cost 
studies (Montanelli and Gerzeli, 2001; Amato et al., 2002; Patti et al., 2011; Leardini et al., 2002; 
Casado et al., 2006; Kobelt et al., 2004;  Kobelt, 2006;  Kobelt et al., 2006a;  Kobelt et al., 2006b; 
Russo et al., 2004; Naci et al., 2010)
6
. 
Social costs are classified as: direct, indirect and intangible. 
Direct costs denote the value of health and not health resources spent for diagnosis, treatment and 
illness therapy
7
. 
Indirect costs refer to the missing production because of illness or of time devoted to the care of 
disabled people. 
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 For further details on disability extra costs see Tibble (2005). 
7
 Clinical examinations, specialist examinations, pharmacological terapy. 
Intangible costs  include all the negative effects produced by illness and that worsen the quality of 
life of the disabled individual and of its family
8
.  
So far, social costs have been estimated using micro data with reference to specific illnesses (Amato 
et al., 2002; Patti et al., 2011; Leardini et al., 2002; Casado et al., 2006; Kobelt, 2006; Kobelt et al., 
2006a;  Kobelt et al., 2006b;  Russo et al., 2004; Naci et al., 2010). As far as we know, macro data 
allowing a quantification of disability costs are not available. In this study we are exclusively 
interested to the effects of disability on household’s income. Therefore we need to compute the 
costs burdening the family income.  
From ISTAT data, it emerges that spending for the care of disabled people is 29.5% of family 
income. This implies that 48% of households reduces consumption to pay dedicated staff, 20% 
corrodes saving and 2.8% has to borrow. In order to have a measure of direct costs, we consider the 
29.5 income family with at least one disabled person as a portion of direct costs. We exclude from 
the calculation the intangible costs, as it is impossible to get information on their amount. 
As for the computation of indirect costs we assume that the family member deciding to not work 
and to care about the disabled member is the spouse. In fact, according to ISTAT (2014, a b) the 
care job is mainly carried out by females. 
To compute indirect costs we use the human capital approach. This allows to estimate the 
productivity loss due to disability. The labour incomes are used to assess the productivity loss due 
to the morbidity, assuming that labour income reflect productivity (Tarricone et al., 2000).  
Following Tarricone et al. (2000) we apply (for both disabled member and who takes care of him) 
the following formula:  
 = 
 ∗  ∗ 	100 −  ∗  
where PLNE is the production losses by not employed; NUDP is the number of unemployed 
disabled people; ALFR is the active labour force rate; where (100-UR) is the percentage of the not 
employed disabled people. The product 
 ∗ 	100 − UR ∗  is the participation rate to the 
labour market of disabled members. AAW is the average annual wage of an employee (Netten and 
Beecham, 1993). Unfortunately, data on disabled persons in working age (15-64) are not available. 
As a matter of fact, ISTAT provides the overall number of disabled persons. Therefore the PLNE 
computation is misrepresented. This actually allows us to compensate, only partially, other 
disability costs that otherwise we cannot compute. 
We apply the same formula for the spouse that devolves her time to the disabled people’s care: 
 = 
 ∗  ∗ 	100 −  ∗ 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 Deterioration of social relationship, isolation, anguish, all affect the quality of life of  the patient (Montanelli and 
Tarricone, 1997). 
where NUW is the number of unemployed women; AFLFR is the active female labour force rate; 
and (100-FUR) is the percentage of unemployed women who gives her time to take care the 
disabled person. FAAW is the female average annual wage of an employed women.  
From ISTAT (2014 b) NUW is equal to 15,5% computed for the number of women in working age 
(15-64).  
 
2.1.3 Direct and indirect costs 
Tables 2 and 3 report the indirect costs associated to the disabled person which doesn’t work  and 
to the spouse which substitutes job with the disabled people’s care. Moreover, Table 4 reports total 
costs (direct plus indirect) for disability. 
In particular, the total cost supported by a D household for the disabled member is 16250,22468€ 
per year. It’s worth stressing to highlight that this cost is distorted because it doesn’t include other 
disability costs that cannot be quantified. 
Table 2- PLNE associated to the disabled person not working, 2013 
PLNE associated to the disabled person not working 
VARIABLES DATA DATA SOURCES 
Total of disabled people (A) 
4100000 (6,7% of 
population) ISTAT 
% of disabled people unemployed individuals (B) 40% ISTAT 
NUDP (C = (A * B)/100) 1640000 
ALFR (D) 0,634 ISTAT 
(100-UR) (E) 0,879 ISTAT 
(*)TALFRDP  (F=C*D*E) 913949,04 
AAW (G) 21137,83297€ INPS 
Total PLNE (H) 19318902155€ 
Annual average PLNE per disabled member (per household) 4711,927355€ 
*Theoretical active labour force of disabled people 
Table 3 - PLNE associated to the spouse not working and taking care of the disabled member, 2013 
PLNE associated to the spouse not working and taking care of the disabled member 
VARIABLES DATA DATA SOURCES 
Female population in age working (A) 19478721 ISTAT 
% of unemployed women because of disabled people’s care (B) 15,50% ISTAT 
NUW (C =( A * B)/100) 3019201,755 
AFLFR (D) 0,536 ISTAT 
(100-FUR) (E) 0,869 ISTAT 
(*) TAFLFR (F=C*D*E) 1406295,87 
FAAW (G) 16728,36482€ INPS 
Total PLNE (H) 23525030357€ 
Annual average PLNE for disabled people’s care (per household) 1207,729725€ 
 
Table 4 - Total costs supported by D households (yearly average), 2013 
COSTS 
Total indirect costs 5919,65708€ 
Total direct costs (29,5% of family income) 10330,5676€ 
TOTAL COSTS  (yearly average) 16250,22468€ 
 
 
The rest of the section concerns the computation of the share of income of D households devolved 
to the disabled people’s care. Moreover we assess how much do CDP need to increase in order to 
cover disability costs. Public transfers actually include not only CDP but also expenditures for 
social interventions in favour of disabled persons. However, in our exercise we consider such an 
expenditure as a fixed cost which is not adjustable by the fiscal authority. In particular, we are 
exclusively interested to investigate the effects of a permanent variation of CDP.  
The share of income devolved to the disabled people’s care is given by the ratio between the total 
costs (16250,22468€) and the D household income (35018,87322€). It is equal to 0.46; therefore the 
46% of the household income is devoted to the care of disabled people
9
. 
To compute the target value of CDP we proceed as follows: 
  !"#$%	"! & 		'#()"&*#+'#()"&"#,#%#$+	'# $-#%#&.	/)+ #!+	0#&1		$&&)+'$+")	$%%!0+$")*)2/)+'#&3()	4!(	 !"#$%	#+&)(,)+&#!+ 	$+'		 )(,#") =1 
We assume that social costs are entirely covered by public transfers. Therefore in order to totally 
repay the total costs, the CDP should be increased by 5607€ per year (it’s about the 72% of the 
current amount of CDP). Once we have taken into account the social costs, it’s interesting to stress 
the effects on the D households income (Table 5). From the equivalized income’s computation, 
when the equivalence coefficient does not consider disability, it emerges that D households are 
never below the poverty threshold. By the opposite, when we consider disability results notably 
change. First of all, the incomes of the two groups of households become much different and D 
households are now below the poverty threshold by about 1033,6254€ (8365,128705€-
7331,503335€). Therefore, the intervention by the policy maker becomes necessary. Thus we ask: 
what does happen, in terms of poverty risk, once the CDP increase by 0.1% at the aggregate level 
(or, equivalently, by 72% per household)? (see Table 6). When we compute the equivalized income 
without considering disability, we observe that D households face a bigger poverty risk but they are 
actually far from the poverty line. When we correct the equivalence coefficient taking into account 
disability we verify that the difference in incomes of the two groups of households is very 
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 Studies for United kingdom show that the extra-costs associated to disability vary between 30-40% of family income 
(Zaidi and Burchardt, 2005; Morciano et al., 2012). 
pronounced. Moreover, although D households are not below the poverty threshold 
(9019,601955€), the poverty risk is very high. As a matter of fact, the difference between the D 
household income and the poverty line is only of 500€(9513,080835€-9019,601955€). 
The increase of 72% of CDP allows to D households to exit from the poverty status but the brink is 
very small. 
We can suppose that the probability that D households are below the poverty threshold is very high. 
In fact, because of data lack we have excludes a lot of other costs from the social costs’ 
computation. This implies that, if we considered all the social costs, the increase of CDP should be 
much higher than 72%. 
Table 5 – Family income per household type out of social costs, year 2013 
ANNUAL AVERAGE VALUES YEAR 2013 
APPROXIMATION HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
D 
HOUSEHOLD 
ND 
 HOUSEHOLD 
Average annual salary (male) (+) 24376,15322€ 24376,15322€ 
Average annual salary (female) (+) . 16728,36482€ 
Civilian disability pension with attendance allowance (+)  7756,72€ . 
Expenditure for social interventions and services (+) 2886€ . 
DIRECT COSTS (-) 10330,5676€ . 
INDIRECT COSTS (-) 5919,65708€ . 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 18768,64854€ 41104,51803€ 
Computation of the equivalized income   
modified OECD scale:  = 1 + 0.5 ∗ 	
 − 1 + 0.3 ∗ 
 2 2 
equivalized income without revision for disability 
9384,324268
€ 20552,25902€ 
poverty line (60% of median equivalent income) 8980,974985€ 
equivalence scale including disability:  = 1.56 ∗ 1 + 0.5 ∗ 	
 − 1 + 0.5 ∗	
 − 
 + 0.3 ∗ 
 2,56 2 
equivalized income with revision for disability 
7331,503335
€ 20552,25902€ 
Poverty line (60% of median equivalent income) 8365,128705€ 
 
Table 6 - Family income per household type out of social costs including the increase of CDP  with 
attendance allowance, year 2013. 
ANNUAL AVERAGE VALUES YEAR 2013 
APPROXIMATION HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
D 
HOUSEHOLD 
ND 
HOUSEHOLD 
Average annual salary (male) (+) 24376,15322€ 24376,15322€ 
Average annual salary (female) (+) . 16728,36482€ 
Civilian disability pension with attendance allowance (+) 7756,72€ . 
Increase of 72% of CDP (+) 5584,8384€   
Expenditure for social interventions and services (+) 2886€ . 
DIRECT COSTS (-) 10330,5676€ . 
INDIRECT COSTS (-) 5919,65708€ . 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 24353,48694€ 41104,51803€ 
Computation of the equivalized income   
modified OECD scale:  = 1 + 0.5 ∗ 	
 − 1 + 0.3 ∗ 
 2 2 
equivalized income without revision for disability 12176,7434€ 20552,25902€ 
Poverty line (60% of median equivalent income) 9818,700745€ 
equivalence scale including disability: :	 = 1.56 ∗ 1 + 0.5 ∗ 	
 − 1 + 0.5 ∗	
 − 
 + 0.3 ∗ 
 2,56 2 
Equivalized  income with revision for disability 9513,08083€ 20552,25902€ 
Poverty line (60% of median equivalent income) 9019,601955€ 
 
 
3 . The Model 
This section describes the model equations. Then, it focuses on the fiscal policy exercise 
implementation and finally reports the parameters’calibration. 
The economy is populated by firms, households and government. 
Firms maximize their profits by taking into account their technological constraint. 
Households maximize their utility function defined on consumption and labor, both subject to 
distortionary taxation. In particular, there are two groups of households: households without any 
disabled member (ND) and households with one disabled member (D). The former optimally make 
their choices in a forward-looking perspective. The latter, as it’s shown in disability literature (see 
Parodi and Sciulli, 2008; Davila Quintano and Malo, 2012), have a lower disposable income 
because of disability expenditures. For that matter, the meager Italian welfare system doesn’t 
support them. Therefore, we assume that these households are rule of thumb (see Campbell and 
Mankiw, 1989; Fuhrer, 2000; Galí, Lopez-Salido, Vallés, 2004, 2007; Bilbiie, 2008; Cowell, 
Karagiannaki and McKnight, 2012; Anderson, Inoue and Rossi, 2013; Iacoviello and  Pavan, 2013), 
since they cannot save neither allocate intertemporally their consumption. Therefore, in each period 5, they entirely consume their disposable income. 
The fiscal authority finances current expenditures by raising labour income and consumption 
taxes
10
.  
 
3.1 Households 
There exists a continuum of households 6, with 6 ∈ 0,1 infinitively living. D and ND households 
are respectively defined on the intervals 0, 9 and  	9,::1. All the households share the same utility 
function
11
: 
;<= = ><∑ @<A<BC DE<=	FGH	FIH − J<=	FKL	F*L M	                       [1] 
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 For simplicity, we assume constant public debt. Therefore the fiscal authority doesn’t  issue new public debt. 
11
 The function u is incresing in consumption, decreasing in labor  and strictly concave.  
N&# and 	ℎ&#  represent individual consumption and labour at time 5, P is a subjective discount factor 	0 < P < 1, & denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information 
available at time 5. The parameters R and S are the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of 
consumption and labor supply, respectively. 
3.1.1  ND households 
ND households maximize the utility function by taking into account the following budget 
constraint: 
N&+'	1 + T&" + & = &IU&IU + V&ℎ&+'W1 − T&1X        [2] 
where		T&" e T&1 respectively denote consumption and labour income tax rates, & is the nominal 
interest rate on bank deposits  and  V& is the real wage. 
These households optimally decide how much to consume, work and save. Therefore the first order 
conditions with respect to consumption N&+', hours ℎ&+' 	and bank deposits & ,  are: 
 
Y&+' = "Z[\	G]WU*^Z_X                  [3] 
Y&+' = 1Z[\	`0WUI^ZaX       [4] 
Y&+' = PY&*U+' &               [5] 
where (3) is the marginal utility of consumption and (4) denotes the labour supply. The Euler 
equation (5) describes the consumption intertemporal allocation by ND households. 
3.1.2 D households 
D households entirely consume their current after-tax labour income plus the civilian disability 
pensions &' and the disability benefits, out of the disability expenditures b&. Therefore their budget 
constraint is the following: 
N&' = 0Z1Z\WUI^ZaXIZ*c\*dZ\WU*^Z_X                             [6] 
where b& = efV&ℎ&'W1 − T&1X + g' + &'h	.	 The parameter e < 1 denotes the disposable 
income’share destined for disability spending. We assume that D households supply only a fraction 
α<1 of hours that they would work if they were ND type. This assumption follows the disability 
literature. Parodi and Sciulli, 2008) argue that D households work less than ND households. Hence: 
ℎ&' = αℎ&+'       [7] 
The marginal utility of D households  is: 
Y&' = "Z\	G]WU*^Z_X                     [8] 
3.2 Firms 
A generic firm
12
 maximizes its profits by taking into account the following technological constraint: 
j& = ℎ&	UIk       [9] 
where	j& is the output of the single final good produced in the economy at time 5, ℎ& is the labor 
input solely used in production. From profits maximization it follows:  
V& = ℎ&Ik	1 − l     [10] 
3.3 Aggregation and  market clearing 
The goods market clearing condition is: 
j& = N&+m&                   [11] 
where the aggregate consumption is defined as: 
N& = 9N&' + 	1 − 9N&+'               [12] 
Moreover, aggregate hours and aggregate marginal utilities of consumption are:  
ℎ& = 9ℎ&' + 	1 − 9ℎ&+'                                                 [13] 
Y& = 9Y&' + 	1 − 9Y&+'                    [14] 
From the ratio CDP to the households D share, we obtain the amount of CDP per household D: 
&' = dZn                            [15] 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 In this model there is a symmetric equilibrium because all the firms are equal: they maximize the same objective 
function subject to the same technological constraint. 
 
3.4 The fiscal sector and the exercise of a permanent increase in CDP  
In this subsection, we describe the fiscal sector and explain the implementation of the fiscal policy 
exercise. At this regard, we use DYNARE software
13
 in MATLAB. 
The exercise entails a transition from one initial steady state where CDP is set at 0.97% of GDP 
(ISTAT, 2013) to a new steady state corresponding to the target value of 1.07% of GDP
14
. 
In order to finance such an increase of CDP, we assume to reduce public spending. This study 
doesn’t consider revenues tools because, as the macroeconomic literature argues (see Nickel, Rother 
and Zimmermann, 2010; Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi, 2012), they are strongly recessive.  
In particular, we use two alternative strategies. The first one is a temporary reduction of public 
consumption. In that case, once public spending has been reduced such that CDP achieves the target 
value, it comes back to the initial steady state level. This implies a worsening in the fiscal 
authority’s budgetary position in the long run, needing an increase of taxation. Differently, the 
second strategy is a permanent reduction of public spending that doesn’t modify the government 
budget position and so doesn’t require any other policy tactic. 
The government budget constraint reads as: 
m& +g + & + g = T&"N& + T&1V&ℎ& + coZ        [16] 
where	m& is the final consumption expenditure including the value of goods and services purchased 
or produced by general government and directly supplied to private households for consumption 
purposes. DB is the public debt. For simplicity, we assume it is constant over time. We rewrite, in 
terms of GDP: 
p& + qr + s& + r = T&" "Z. + T&1 0Z1Z. + '-oZ        [17] 
where p& ≝ uZ.∗, qr ≝ c.∗ ,	s& ≝ dZ.∗  respectively denote public spending, public debt and civilian 
disability pensions in terms of the target value of GDP. During the transition, we assume the 
following fiscal rule, where the public expenditure path depends upon the CDP dynamics: 
 
v wZw∗∗x = v /Z/∗∗xIyz          [18] 
 
                                                          
13
 For further details see the web page http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/ 
 
14
 As it is explained in Section 2, this is the target value allowing households with a disabled member to exit from 
poverty status. 
where p∗∗ = u.∗∗ is the public consumption to GDP ratio. 
Following Ferrara and Tirelli (2014), since we are not interested in policy-induced long-run changes 
in consumption-labour ratios, we posit that the relative tax rates are constant both during the 
transition and in the long-run: 
 
^Z_^Za = ^_∗^a∗ = ^_∗∗^a∗∗.  
In other words consumption and labour tax rates have the same path during the transition. Then for 
the sake of brevity, from now on we only refer to consumption tax rate. 
In the long run, if public consumption only temporarily reduces, we assume that there is a gradual 
increase of the tax rates according to the following
15
: T&" = 	1−{"T&IU" +{"T&"∗∗          [19] 
As results are going to show, temporary and permanent reduction of public spending differentiate 
each other not only for the process duration but mostly for the different impact on consumption 
behaviour of the two groups of households. 
 
3.5 Calibration 
This section describes the parameters’ calibration.
16
 
Structural Parameters 
 
Following Galí (2001), we assume a log utility for consumption, which corresponds to R = 1, and 
set the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour supply S equal to 1. 
According to a conservative parameterization in the macroeconomic literature, the subjective 
discount factor P is set to 0.99. 
The labour share parameter in the production function 	1 − l  is calibrated following OECD data 
for Italy,
17
 namely 0.6.  
 
Disability Parameters 
 
Calibration of parameters describing D households’ behaviour is extensively justified in Section 2. 
In particular, we set the size of the group of households with a disabled member equal to 10% of 
Italian population. 
                                                          
15
 The same fiscal rule applies to the labor income tax rate. 
16
 In Appendix A, Table A1 summerizes the parameters’calibration. 
17
 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?queryname=345&querytype=view, last access  05/24/2015. 
Italian data show that hours worked by D households are the 50% of hours worked by ND 
households, hence the parameter | = 0.5. Moreover, the share of the disposable income intended 
for disabled people’s care is 46%; therefore e = 0.46. 
 
Fiscal sector parameters 
 
As for fiscal sector, we follow ISTAT  2012 (last available data)
18
 to set the initial value of CDP  s∗ 
at 0.97% of GDP. Moreover, in order that D households exit from poverty
19
 status, it’s necessary 
that CDP increase of 0.1%. Therefore, the target value of CDP s∗∗ is 1.07% of GDP. 
The parameter governing the CDP path {w in the government spending rule is set equal to 1. This 
guarantees that public consumption closely tracks the CDP dynamics. Moreover, such a calibration 
is often used for fiscal rules (see Coenen, Mohr and Straub, 2008; Ferrara and Tirelli, 2014). We set 
the parameter {" in (19) equal to 0.03, such that tax increase is only gradual. The initial value of the 
tax rate ratio 
^_^a  is calibrated according to ISTAT data 2013, where the consumption tax rate is 
equal to 21% and the labour tax is computed through the mean value of the several batches of 
income considered by the Italian system
20
. Thereafter, while the steady state value of consumption 
tax rate is calibrated such that the fiscal authority’s budget is balanced, the initial value of labour tax 
rate is anchored to the consumption-labour tax rate ratio.  
Finally, the debt to GDP ratio db is set at 129%, following EUROSTAT 2013. 
 
4. Results 
Results show that an increase of 0.1% of CDP does allow D households to exit from poverty 
condition. As a matter of fact, the target value of CDP is the one minimum necessary so that the 
poverty threshold is overcome.   
However, the implementation of temporary or permanent reduction of public consumption does 
matter to understand the impact of fiscal policy on the macroeconomic variables. 
 
4.1 Long-run results: percentage variations after CDP increase 
Long-run results (Table 7) show that an increase in CDP, through both temporary and permanent 
decline of public spending, reduces income inequality between the two groups of households. The 
effect is stronger in case of temporary decrease. In fact, the relative consumption of  D households 	N'/N	 raises by about 5%. The relative consumption of ND households 	N+'/N reduces by 0.22% 
                                                          
18
 http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/117355, last access  05/24/2015. 
19
 For further details see Section 2.  
20
 In Italy labor tax is progressive. 
if public spending’s decline is permanent. Differently, if public spending’s contraction is temporary 
and requires tax increase, 	N+'/N reduces by 0.35%. 
In case of temporary reduction of public expenditure, aggregate consumption variation is exactly 
equal to the negative variation of GDP (see equation 11)), namely 0.13%. If public consumption 
permanently reduces, not only it dampens the recessionary effect but also produces an increase of 
aggregate consumption. This also reflects the restrained reduction of hours worked. 
Finally, disability expenditures H increase more when taxation is constant. In fact, if this is the case, 
disposable income of D households  increases. 
 
Table 7- Steady state percentage variations 
Variable Temporary Reduction g Permanent Reduction  g  5.7 6.2  -0.35 0.14  -0.13 0.36 	/ 5.8 5.8 	/ -0.35 -0.22  -0.13 -0.06  -0.21 -0.09  5.9 6.2  1.4221 0  1.42 0 
 
Summarizing, if the temporary reduction of public consumption entails a bigger decline of income 
inequality between the two groups of households, the permanent reduction dampens the 
unavoidable recessionary effect. 
 
4.2 Short-run results 
In this section we show the short-run effects of a permanent increase of CDP. 
Figure 3 reports transitions (expressed in percentage variations from the first steady state) of the 
key macroeconomic variables after an increase of 0.1% of CDP. 
The dashed line denotes the case of temporary reduction of public spending and consequent 
increase of taxation. The solid line represents the case of permanent decline of public consumption 
and taxation remain constant at the initial steady state level.  
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 Le  aliquote di imposta presentano la stessa variazione per quanto assunto nel modello.  
  
 
 
Figure 3 -  Short-run effects of a permanent increase of CDP 
 
Consider first the temporary reduction case. Under this assumption, results  report an immediate 
surge of CDP even overshooting the target value before reaching it. This produces a direct positive 
impact on consumption behaviour of D households via their budget constraint. At least during the 
first two quarters, also ND households’ consumption increases. As a matter of fact, they expect 
future tax cuts after the public consumption decline (wealth effect). However, as soon as they know 
that reduction is only temporary they reduce their consumption because they know that instead there 
will be a tax rate increase. It follows that aggregate consumption raises in the first phase of 
transition and then declines in the last ones. 
If public spending reduction is permanent, CDP dynamics is very inertial to achieve the target 
value. In fact it takes about 20 years. Although the process’ inertia, D households’ consumption 
increases as well. Also ND households’ consumption raises because of the “pure” wealth effect.  
It follows that a gradual increase of consumption of the two groups and so of aggregate 
consumption, together with an inertial decline of public consumption, implies a lither recessionary 
effect. 
Therefore, once the exit from the poverty condition for D households is warranted by the policy 
action, during the transition the policy maker alternatively may: 
 to prefer an immediate surge of CDP. This would produce a strong increase of D 
households’ consumption but would entail a deep recession; 
 to prefer an inertial increase of CDP. This strategy would only slightly stimulate  D 
households’ consumption but it would be able to restrain the negative real effect. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we show the effects of an increase of civilian disability pensions, mainly focusing on 
consumption of households with one disabled member. The analysis is performed simulating a Real 
Business Cycle model. This simplification is an advantage because it allows to identify the 
transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy at work. This become even important because, as far as 
we know, this is the first contribution analyzing the economic consequences of disability issue in a 
general equilibrium framework.  
The fiscal policy exercise is implemented through a reduction, both temporary and permanent, of 
public consumption. 
Results seem to be very appealing. In particular, they show that a minimum increase of 0.1% of 
civilian disability pensions warrants the exit from the poverty condition for D households. 
Moreover it stimulates their consumption entailing a reduction in income inequality between the 
two groups of households. Moreover, the transmission mechanisms are importantly different 
according to a permanent or temporary reduction of public spending.  
Future research agenda will include the implementation of the same fiscal policy exercise in a New 
Keynesian DSGE model. Moreover the analysis will be focused on Italian regions to capture the 
heterogeneity of fiscal policy impact among  regional economies. 
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APPENDIX A: Calibration 
Table A1 – Parameters Calibration 
Parameters Values Description 
 
      Structural Parameters  
 1 Inverse  of the elasticity of  intertemporal substitution of consumption 
 1 Inverse  of the elasticity of  intertemporal substitution of labor supply 
 0.99 Subjective discount factor 
	F −  0.6 Labor share in production function 
                                                          Disability Parameters 
9 0.1 Fraction of D households 
 0.5 Hours worked by D households as a share of hours worked by ND households 
 0.46 D household’s share of disposable income allocated to the care of the disabled 
person. 
                                                                                                      Fiscal Sector Parameters 
p* 0.97% Initial value of the civilian disability pensions to GDP ratio 
p** 1.07% Target value of the civilian disability pensions to GDP ratio 
 1 Fiscal rule public spending 
 0.03 Fiscal rule taxation 
 0.75 Tax rate ratio consumption/labour 
d 129% Debt to GDP ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: Steady states given parameters’ calibration 
This appendix reports the computation of  the steady state values of endogenous variables, given the 
equilibrium conditions and the parameters’ calibration. 
From the Euler equation (5) we obtain the nominal interest rate. In steady state the following holds: Y+' = 	PY+'          [B1] 
 
Hence: 
 = U            [B2] 
 
Moreover from the equations  (3) e (4), it holds: 
 
"[\	G]	U*^_ = 1[\	`0WUI^aX          [B3] 
 
From [B3] we can write N+' as a function of  ℎ+'. Moreover, given that R and  S are equal to 1, we 
obtain: 
N+' = 0WUI^aX1[\	U*^_          [B4] 
 
From (6), the budget constraint of households D in steady state is: 
 
N' = 01\WUI^aXI*c\*d\	U*^_                                                                                         [B5] 
 
Then we substitute the disability expenditure b  in (B5) and rewrite disability benefits g' and CDP  ' in terms of GDP, where g' = r'j,  ' = s'j  e  j = ℎ	UIk. Therefore we obtain: 
N' = 	UIf01\WUI^aX*W-\*/\X1	Gh	U*^_                                                                         [B6] 
From the aggregate resource constraint, we take into account the aggregate consumption equation 
(12) and rewrite public spending as m = u. j = pj = pℎ	UIk and finally get the following 
expression: 
 
ℎ	UIk = 9 	UIf01\WUI^aX*W-\*/\X1	Gh	U*^_  + 	1 − 9 0WUI^aX1[\	U*^_+ 	pℎ	UIk        [B7] 
 
From the real wage equation (10), in steady state it holds: 
V = ℎIk	1 − l                                                                                                     [B8] 
Substituting (B8) in (B7), we rewrite: 
ℎ	UIk = 9 	UI1G	UIk1\WUI^aX*W-\*/\X1	G	U*^_  + 	1 − 9 1G	UIkWUI^aX1[\	U*^_  + pℎ	UIk  [B9] 
Solving the system of equations [B9] and (13), and rewriting (13) as 	ℎ+' = 1n*	UIn  and finally 
solving for aggregate hours: 
ℎ =

 	G	GvGax	K_ n*	UIn
UI	G 	K_¡	G¢WGaX¢K	G *W-\*/\X£Iw¤¥¦
§v
¨x
                                                        [B10] 
Solving for hours worked of households ND, we obtain: 
ℎ+' = 1n*	UIn                 [B11] 
We can now compute [B4] and [B6] and the following steady state expressions: 
- Aggregate consumption: N = 9N' + 	1 − 9N+'                                                                            [B12] 
 
- Marginal utility of consumption of households D: 	
Y' = "\	G]	U*^_		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 									B13 
- Marginal utility of consumption of households ND: 
Y+' = 1[\	`0WUI^aX                [B14] 
- Average marginal utility:  
            Y = 9Y' + 	1 − 9Y+'               [B15] 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
